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INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the major decisions of the Supreme Court in 
developing a “takings doctrine” based in large measure on how the 
early American experience viewed private property and how the right 
to own property was originally protected by the Constitution. This 
paper further explores the linkage between our protected property 
rights and how those rights may be affected by government regulation 
seeking to protect environmental values. Finally, the paper advocates 
a modification of the Supreme Court’s current takings doctrine to 
account for an ecological realism that must be incorporated into our 
“bundle of rights” of property ownership in order to establish a new 
rationale for takings claims based on an awareness that man and 
nature must be in balance. 
The presentation is divided into six sections: First, I will review the 
intellectual history and institutional protection of private property as 
they have evolved from English common law into the American 
experience. Second, I will document the key components of the 
takings issue, as enunciated through judicial decisions that have 
involved the constitutional protection of private property rights in 
juxtaposition to government regulations to protect the public interest. 
Third, I will look at the rights of man and the rights of nature. Fourth, 
I will discuss the infusion of ecological values into the law. Fifth, I 
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will review the concept of a land ethic and an ecological imperative. 
And finally, the paper will lay out the parameters by which to fashion 
a new takings doctrine that is predicated on developing an ecological 
use theory of property. 
I 
PRIVATE PROPERTY: AN INTELLETUAL AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Through the ages, Western civilized man has constructed a number 
of philosophical theories about property and systems of property 
rights. These have ranged from the right of the individual to own 
private property as a basic “natural right” to the condemnation of 
private property as an instrument for the oppression of the many by 
the few. Regardless of which theory has been in vogue at any time in 
history, a clear pattern has been established—how a society uses its 
land is directly related to its history, cultural development, and 
institutional rules. 
A. Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Private Property 
It is important to recognize at the outset that in colonial America, 
men of learning were well read in the classics: literature, history, and 
philosophy, as well as theology. To them, the term “natural law” had 
developed over centuries and was “used in the sense of expressing 
laws which are descriptive of human nature, of natural processes, and 
of the principles of social and political relationships.”1 Natural law 
gave legitimacy to natural rights, which was especially appealing to 
Enlightenment thinking in England, France, and America where the 
rights of man were becoming more closely accentuated with the role 
of government. Generally, the natural rights doctrine rested on two 
philosophical premises: First, it was based on moral laws, which 
needed no proof. Second, its “effectiveness . . . as a slogan in political 
struggles militated against its continuing theoretical refinement.”2 
To use the term “property” in seventeenth century England and 
eighteenth century America was to “speak of civil rights as private 
 
1 BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL 
LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 331 (1931). 
2 Charles Frankel, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, in A HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS 266, 269 (Vergilius Ferm ed., 1950). 
COHEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2014  8:41 AM 
306 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 28, 303 
 
property.”3 In this usage, “[a] personal civil right claimed as a 
birthright or an inheritance, although truly property in the same sense 
as was land, chattels, and inchoate obligations, was a higher kind of 
property as it was a species of civil liberty and personal rights.”4 As a 
result, this conceptualization of rights and liberties as “individual 
property” was “simply the way rights were explained, a theory of 
antithesis between the authority of kings and the personally owned 
rights of the subject.”5 
The American intellectual experience, before the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1787, was not so much unique as it was an extension 
of both English Common Law and eighteenth-century natural law 
philosophy. As a point of political pragmatism, it was necessary that 
America’s institutional development be predicated on “old-world 
precedent and authority.”6 This would facilitate the creation of a new 
government that would evolve from already understood ideas and 
ideals of natural law and natural rights. It was this philosophical 
environment that prompted Samuel Adams to proclaim that John 
Locke was “one of the greatest men that ever wrote.”7 
B. Locke’s View of Private Property as a Natural Right 
When John Locke completed his Two Treatises of Government in 
1690, he was seeking to justify the newly won supremacy of the 
English Parliament over the Crown in the “Glorious Revolution” of 
1688. There was, according to Locke, a state of nature in which men 
enjoyed complete liberty; that men will create government, an 
authority superior to their individual wills; and that government thus 
created will manifest certain specific powers, above all the protection 
of property—the natural rights of man. While these natural law 
assertions were not original to Locke, they “were transmitted to 
Americans chiefly through his writings . . . [as] principles . . . 
universal in scope . . . .”8 
 
3 1 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 103 (1986). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 106. 
6 1 VERNON LOUIS PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: THE 
COLONIAL MIND 237 (1927). 
7 Id. 
8 JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 170 (1943). 
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Locke’s theory of the right to private property was analogous with 
natural rights. According to Professor Sabine, “[i]n the state of nature, 
Locke believed, property was common in the sense that everyone had 
a right to draw subsistence from whatever nature offers.”9 Locke’s 
assertion stretched to the use of private property in that “man has a 
natural right to that with which he has ‘mixed’ the labor of his body, 
as for example by enclosing and tilling land.”10  Locke wrote that 
“God gave the soil to mankind at large, but as no one enjoys either the 
soil or that which it produces unless he be owner, individuals must be 
allowed the use, to the exclusion of all others.”11 
Property was therefore a basic human right, necessary to one’s 
existence and the foundation of liberty. “Americans of the founding 
generation understood property in this broad Lockean sense, which 
we have regrettably lost.”12 
C. Private Property as the Hallmark of American Liberty 
The relationship between natural rights and private property as a 
natural right was to have an undeniable importance as the American 
Constitution began to take shape. In fact, the natural rights-private 
property doctrine that was to become uniquely American was that 
“[i]ts distinctive characteristics are its emphasis upon rights instead of 
functions, and its identification of property with individuality.”13  
Ownership of private property was considered one of the essential 
human rights. Clearly, the “American leaders were convinced that 
rights of property were as indispensable as any other rights of the 
 
9 GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 527 (3d ed. 1961). 
10 Id. In 1776, the year the Declaration of Independence was signed, Adam Smith 
published An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Smith’s 
reliance on the individual’s self interest becomes manifest by man’s industrious use of his 
own labor in enjoying use of his property. Therefore, hindering a man from employing his 
labor by improper government regulations is unjust. See ANDREW REEVE, PROPERTY 57–
63 (1986) (providing an interesting comparison of the Lockean and Smith views). 
11 1 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 2.05 (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2013), available at LexisNexis. 
12 LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 
RIGHTS, AND HISTORY 18 (1995). 
13 David Fellman, The European Background of Early American Ideas Concerning 
Property, 14 TEMPLE L.Q. 497, 502–03 (1940). 
COHEN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2014  8:41 AM 
308 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 28, 303 
 
individual and formed a root of the Tree of Liberty without which that 
tree would languish.”14 
D. Blackstone and the Law of Property 
The first comprehensive law book printed in the American colonies 
was Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England.15 This multivolume work, which was originally published in 
England, had a great influence on the colonial intelligentsia, who 
were busily formulating a new government.16 Professor Charles Haar 
has remarked that Blackstone’s “emphasis on natural law fitted in 
with the peculiar environment of law in America. Because of the 
Commentaries English common law became also the common law of 
the United States.”17 
In Blackstone’s construct, “[t]here is nothing which so generally 
strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the 
right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”18 Haar 
calls Blackstone a “system-builder” in that he skillfully brought 
together centuries of laws and unified them as a “statement of the 
eighteenth century’s ideas and assumptions as applied to the ordering 
of society through law. They are perhaps the supreme exposition of 
law as being founded in the law of nature or the law of God.”19 
To Blackstone, “[p]rivate ownership began as an institution of the 
law of nature; civil societies were organized to secure the rights of 
property which had already been created; but civil societies were also 
 
14 A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEADE: MAGNA CARTA AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 333 (1968). 
15 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: OF PUBLIC 
WRONGS (Robert Malcolm Kerr ed., Beacon Press 1962) (1765–69). 
16 Professor of law John C.P. Goldberg discussed the impact of Blackstone’s work as 
the Commentaries were probably as significant in the new republic as in England.   
. . . the lawyer-elite of the founding era knew their Blackstone. . . . American law 
on basic matters such as property, crime, and procedure largely tracked English law 
and, in the absence of widespread access to law libraries, the Commentaries served 
as an invaluable comprehensive, yet portable survey of that law. 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 68 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002). 
17 Charles M. Haar, Preface to 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at xxii–xxiii. 
18 Id.; see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
OF THE RIGHTS OF THINGS, ch. 2 (Edward Christian ed., Oxon 1982) (1765–69). 
19 Haar, supra note 17, at xxvii. 
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empowered to abridge or extend these natural rights.”20 In essence, 
the right to use and dispose of property in the Blackstone context 
could be said to have been a precursor to what would much later 
become government regulations as land use controls. 
E. An Emerging Constitutional Doctrine 
Professor Schlatter, in his important survey of how property has 
been viewed from ancient times to the nineteenth century, succinctly 
states that as “each age has, and will have, to manufacture a theory 
appropriate to its own needs, it is also true that thinking about 
property, has always moved within the framework of certain forms 
and general ideas.”21 One of the key elements that needed resolution, 
as an essential underpinning of American constitutional doctrine, 
concerned how private property ownership would be recognized and 
protected.22 
While it may simply be a curiosity of history, the Preamble to the 
Constitution did not mention property. It mentions liberty, justice, and 
domestic tranquility.23 However, the framers did ensure within the 
body of the Constitution (as originally ratified and subsequently 
amended) provisions for the protection of property rights in several of 
its key clauses. These include: Article I, Section 10, which prohibits 
states from impairing the obligation of contracts;24 Article IV, Section 
2, which provides that citizens of each of the states are entitled to all 
privileges and immunities in any other state;25 the Fifth Amendment, 
 
20 RICHARD  SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 167 (1951). 
21 Id. at 10. 
22 See Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. 
REV. 691, 703 (1938) (“Under no legal system can it be doubted that possession is the 
normal manifestation of ownership. But possession is visible, ownership a mere concept. 
Consequently, the elements constitutive of a possession which the law will protect tend 
inevitably to become the test of ownership.”); see also Morris Cohen, Property and 
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (“[A] property right is not to be identified 
with the fact of physical possession. Whatever technical definition of property we may 
prefer, we must recognize that a property right is a relation not between an owner and a 
thing, but between the owner and other individuals in reference to things.”). 
23 See Michael Kammen, The Rights of Property, and the Property in Rights; The 
Problematic Nature of ‘Property’ in the Political Thought of the Founders and the Early 
Republic, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
1, 1 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
25 Id. art. IV, § 2. 
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which states that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without compensation;26 the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits 
the states from abridging the privileges and immunities of any 
citizen;27 and both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which 
prohibit governments from depriving persons of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.28 
The early American intellectual understanding of the term 
“property,” as we have reviewed, embraced what James Madison 
called the “larger and juster meaning,” defined as “every thing to 
which a man may attach a value and have a right,” rather than in the 
more restricted sense that would solely depict land.29 Yet, as history 
would unfold, property would envelop the more narrow meaning and 
refer to man’s possession of land, as well as personal property 
including furniture, paintings, and stock. 
From the beginning of the earliest Supreme Court decisions, the 
use of natural law and natural rights had to do with the rights of 
private property. For example, in 1795 Justice William Patterson, one 
of the framers of the Constitution, set the theme for later Court 
decisions by proclaiming in Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance that “it 
is evident . . . that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and 
having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable 
rights of man.”30 In addressing the subject of the case, he said, “[t]he 
legislature, therefore, had no authority to make an act devesting [sic] 
one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in another, without a just 
compensation. It is inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice, 
and moral rectitude.”31 
In 1829, Justice Joseph Story’s refrain in Wilkinson v. Leland 
continued the judicial recognition of the importance of property rights 
when he said 
[t]hat government can scarcely be deemed to be free where the 
rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of the 
legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of 
 
26 Id. amend. V. 
27 Id. amend. XIV. 
28 Id. amends. V, XIV. 
29 James Madison, Property, PHILA. NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, quoted in LEVY, 
supra note 12, at 20; see 1 REID, supra note 3, at 44. 
30 Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795). 
31 Id. 
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a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty 
and private property should be held sacred.32 
F. Defining Property: Going Beyond Natural Law 
The shift from natural law as a justification to guarantee property 
rights to positive law—embodied in statutes or common law––was 
inevitable as a new nation began to experience new realities and a 
growing mercantile spirit in a changing world. In a real sense, the 
eighteenth-century association of property rights with liberty—each 
considered natural rights—were relegated “more as broad, 
‘atmospheric’ concepts than as terms of legal precision.”33 
The long line of court decisions that were to come would frame 
new dimensions for both the use of property and how government 
would be allowed to regulate it. But what is this entity that would be 
addressed and regulated? Land, ownership, or both? Is it an intangible 
natural right or just a piece of the earth? Let us, for the sake of future 
discussion, accept Professor Felix Cohen’s definition of private 
property as “a relationship among human beings such that the so-
called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit 
others to engage in those activities and in either case secure the 
assistance of the law in carrying out his decision.”34 
Property could be defined in a number of ways, but I have selected 
this one since it embodies three variables that will be utilized in the 
remaining sections of this paper: relationships, activities, and the law. 
In this context, I will be specifically concerned with man’s 
relationship to land as this embodies the notion of use, not so much 
ownership. 
Moreover, we cannot be so naive to think that property exists in 
isolation. As Professor Sax remarked, “[p]articular parcels are tied to 
one another in complex ways, and property is more accurately 
described as being inextricably part of a network of relationships that 
 
32 Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657 (1829). 
33 Glen O. Robertson, Evolving Conceptions of ‘Property’ and ‘Liberty’ in Due Process 
Jurisprudence, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 63, 71 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman 
eds., 1989). 
34 Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV., 357, 373 (1954). 
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is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries 
with which the legal system is accustomed with dealing.”35 
The crux of the relationship between man and property is the belief 
that the nature of man and the existence of property are inextricably 
bound together. This raises a question that I will explore later: how 
can we use our land in ways that are compatible with the nature of 
man? 
II 
THE USE OF PROPERTY: PRIVATE DECISIONS VERSUS PUBLIC 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. Overview 
As we review the major U.S. Supreme Court decisions affecting 
the use of private property, we can gain an important perspective as to 
how judicial decisions have or have not been socially responsible in 
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of both individuals and 
communities. The case law that we have come to rely on has been 
built, in large measure, on precedent. It has recognized the importance 
of historic continuity, but has also been open to assimilation and 
accommodation. For any issue that must be decided by judicial 
authority, one could ask, is there an ideal justice that will hold a 
universal truth through all time or is there a relative justice that will 
be pertinent only for a particular time? 
The history of the development of American society—its towns, 
cities, the hinterland, and the frontier—has been one of continued 
growth and expansion. Our national history has been one of 
exploration and settlement, of striking out for new inventions and 
creating new means to reach an end. Towns and then cities have 
grown and declined; suburban areas have mushroomed out of vast 
open spaces and farmland. Our story is one of increasing 
opportunities for consumption. The great trilogy of the Declaration of 
Independence, “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” seems to 
have given way to a more contemporary motto—conformity, status, 
and the pursuit of affluence. 
While the basic needs of man have not changed over millennia, we 
have witnessed changing attitudes, as well as societal expectations. 
 
35 Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 
(1971). 
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And we have placed new and greater demands on ourselves, to 
produce new goods for consumption and to seek new methods to 
conquer our surroundings and master our natural resources. Have we, 
as Barry Commoner wrote, “broken out of the circle of life”?36 Are 
we stuck in the “paradoxical role we play in the natural environment,” 
which as both participant and exploiter has given us a distorted 
perception of it?37 
B. Issues of Property Rights, Property Use, and Public Purpose 
From the vantage point of today, we should not only look back to 
historical events and judicial decisions affecting property rights and 
use but also make an assessment as to the appropriateness of previous 
interpretations of the law and how such interpretations might serve a 
continually evolving society. In this regard, four issues can be defined 
in order to delineate a framework to address property rights and 
public responsibility issues in the future: (1) individual rights of 
property as protected by the Constitution; (2) the right of an 
individual to the enjoyment of private property free from the 
unreasonable interference of his neighbor; (3) governmental 
restrictions on an individual’s use of property and how far restrictions 
can go before there is a constitutional violation of one’s rights; and 
(4) the struggle to find an equitable balance between the rights of the 
individual property owner and the right of the public to a healthy 
environment and a livable community. 
The first three issues will be the focus of the next two sections, 
while the fourth will be addressed in Parts V, VI, and VII. 
C. The Challenge to Protect Private Property Rights 
The protection of private property rights finds its strongest legal 
safeguard in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which says, in 
part, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”38 This established a rationale that would eventually 
create a compensation justification by which government could 
exercise the power of eminent domain so long as a private property 
 
36 BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 299 
(1971). 
37 Id. at 14. 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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owner was properly compensated. Professor William Stoebuck points 
out that the constitutional framers were not clear about “public use.”39 
Consequently, what has evolved as the “public-use doctrine” would 
allow property to be taken only if used by the public.40 He maintains 
that 
[e]minent domain poses no special threat to the individual that 
would require special limitations on the occasions of its exercise. It 
is not black magic, but merely one of the powers of government, to 
be used along with the other powers as long as some ordinary 
purpose of government is served.41 
A corollary to the right to hold private property is the responsibility 
to refrain from using it in a manner that would cause harm or injury to 
abutting or neighboring property owners. The emergence of the 
“police power” doctrine during the 1850s and formalized in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, while ensuring an individual due process and 
equal protection, did convey certain governmental prerogatives in 
establishing regulations to protect society. 
Under our system it is the states that exercise the police power as a 
means to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public. In 
essence, the notion of nuisance plays into the property rights equation 
in that absolute and uncontrolled use of one’s property has never been 
considered a protected property right. As a result, state and local 
governments in exercising the police power may regulate private 
property, permitting defined land uses and the extent to which those 
uses may flourish through the adoption of land use controls. 
Following from the above, since there are distinctions among the 
constitutional provisions that protect private property rights, there are 
two factors that have raised legal issues concerning the utilization of 
these protections under the government’s role in protecting the public 
interest through land use controls.42 First, “[l]and owners complain 
that, under the guise of environmental laws and land use regulations, 
 
39 See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 
553 (1972). 
40 Id. at 589–91. 
41 Id. at 597. 
42 This distinction between the eminent domain and police power as distinct powers of 
government has been discussed this way: “Legitimately exercised, the police power 
requires no compensation. Thus, if public use is truly coterminous with the police power, a 
state could freely choose between compensation and noncompensation any time its actions 
served a ‘public use.’” Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 61, 70 (1986). 
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public officials too often display gross insensitivity to constitutionally 
protected private property.”43 The second factor is that “[d]isputes 
have involved questions about the amount of compensation offered, 
and occasionally about whether the purpose sought to be achieved by 
government is sufficiently ‘public,’ rather than about government’s 
basic authority to take private property.”44 
Part of the dilemma that the history of judicial decisions has 
encountered is that “[p]olice power and eminent domain are pictured 
as though they were on a continuum. If a police power regulation 
goes too far in the direction of eminent domain, by depriving an 
owner of too much control over the property owned, it is 
unconstitutional.”45 One way to distinguish between regulation and 
takings is to analyze the purposes of the government action. By 
briefly reviewing the decisions of the Court, under the rubric of the 
“takings issue,” we can more fully understand both the dimensions of 
the dilemma described above, as well as the changing philosophy that 
has developed the way our governments shape the way we use our 
property.46 
 
43 Jerold S. Kayden, Private Property Rights, Government Regulation, and the 
Constitution: Searching for Balance, in LAND USE IN AMERICA 295, 295 (Henry L. 
Diamond & Patrick F. Noonan eds., 1996). 
44 Id. at 297. 
45 ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1987). 
46 Cf. NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, 3 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING 
LAW §§ 5:1 to :7, available at Westlaw (discussing the history of land use law in the 
twentieth century being roughly divided into five periods that have reflected changing 
attitudes toward property rights and property use). “[In the first two decades] before the 
zoning principle was generally accepted, the courts recognized the traditional power to 
deal with nuisances . . . . However, . . . attempts to go further were held invalid . . . .” Id. § 
5.2. The second period began with the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold zoning in 1926, 
which gave legitimacy to land use controls and, in appropriate cases, government “could 
(for example) take away the commercial and industrial development rights without 
compensation.” Summary to WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 46. The third period, during 
the 1950s and 1960s, “the courts went to the other extreme, tending to uphold anything for 
which there was anything to be said.” Id. The fourth, period from about 1970 to the mid-
1980s, was influenced by the growing environmental protection movement and an 
increasing interest in quality of life issues. This was a time in which the emphasis was 
made “to balance the various interests, with a more sophisticated understanding of the 
forum in which the various claims were presented.” Id. Beginning in 1986, the Court 
began “to require a mandatory damage remedy,” representing a shift back “towards the 
philosophy and practice of the second period.” Id. A good analysis of the judicial variables 
that the Court has dealt with from the beginning of takings litigation is found in Jonathan 
E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and Land-Use Based 
Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (1995). A thorough discussion  
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D. The Supreme Court’s Evolving Doctrine on the “Takings Issue” 
As America became more industrialized in the nineteenth century, 
local governments began to enact new laws and regulations that 
increasingly imposed restrictions on private property in order to 
protect the public health and safety. This opened up inevitable 
challenges that government was moving too far to restrict property 
rights. When landowners sought compensation, the Court was usually 
unsympathetic. 
In 1887, the Court held in Mugler v. Kansas that when the state 
acts under its police power to ban a “noxious” use that the state 
determines is injurious to the public health, no compensation is 
required.47 In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the City of Los Angeles had 
banned brickmaking because the operation spewed “fumes, gases, 
smoke, soot, steam, and dust” into the air and infringed on 
surrounding residential neighborhoods.48 The factory owner argued 
that a taking had occurred because he had been in the “neighborhood” 
before residential development and he had been entirely deprived of 
the use of his property.49 The Court rejected the argument and held 
that the City was promoting a legitimate public need.50 
By 1922, the distinction between a physical taking of property and 
a regulatory taking had its first important resolution in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon when the Court accepted the principle that 
governmental regulations can cause a taking even if there is no 
physical invasion of the property.51 The Court needed to evaluate the 
appropriate uses of the state’s police power that regulated the noxious 
use of land in order to prevent harm to society.52 The case prompted 
Justice Holmes to state, “[t]he general rule . . . is that while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking.”53 This point would establish the essential 
principle that would guide regulatory takings jurisprudence to the 
 
of the history of the takings issue as it relates to the purchase and transfer of development 
rights is contained in LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 
14:6 (2012), available at Westlaw. 
47 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
48 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408 (1915). 
49 See id. at 405–08. 
50 Id. at 410. 
51 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
52 Id. at 416. 
53 Id. at 415. 
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present time as the lower courts were left to “tinker with the bare 
words of the Just Compensation Clause and Justice Holmes’ gloss to 
govern property rights versus government regulation disputes.”54 
In disagreeing with the harm/benefit conclusion of the majority, 
Justice Brandeis stressed that forbidding coal mining is “merely the 
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the 
possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any 
use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use 
which interferes with paramount rights of the public.”55 This view 
was to re-emerge in later legal scholarship and judicial analysis as 
will be discussed below. 
Thirty-nine years after Mugler in the first test of the validity of 
zoning in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court 
ruled on due process and equal protection challenges to a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance.56 Despite the fact that the ordinance 
reduced the economic value of the plaintiff’s property by prohibiting 
industrial uses in residential districts, the zoning of land to restrict use 
was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.57 
By 1978, the Court reaffirmed the accepted takings ruling that an 
owner must be denied all reasonable use of a property for a taking to 
occur. In Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York, the Court concluded that takings cases must be decided by a 
three-part test.58 First, “the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant”; second, “the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations”; and third, “the 
character of the governmental action.”59 The most noteworthy 
precedent established by Penn Central was that economic 
considerations would be a crucial test in determining all takings 
claims. Since the takings question “‘necessarily requires a weighing 
of private and public interests,’ the balance cannot be accurately and 
 
54 Kayden, supra note 43, at 298. 
55 Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 393 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
56 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
57 Id. at 397. In the two years following Euclid, the Court continued to uphold the 
regulatory power of local government to enact zoning districts and restrict land uses. See, 
e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 
(1927); Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works of L.A., 274 U.S. 325 (1927). 
58 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
59 Id. at 124. 
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efficiently struck when the value of the claimant’s remaining interest 
is determined in an artificial vacuum that fails to reflect the 
marketplace.”60 
The Penn Central case marked a turning point in the Court’s 
position on the takings issue. “The decision precedes a period in 
which the Court continued to uphold land-use regulations despite 
their economic impact on certain property owners, while also taking 
on cases in which the Court would affirm the existence of inviolate 
spheres of property interests.”61 In effect, the Court would “begin to 
engage in more frequent and more demanding scrutiny of the 
legislative and administrative details of land-use regulation.”62 
Cases beginning in the 1980s and extending into the next decade 
brought under sharper focus the concerns of state and local planning 
authorities relative to their exercise of police power and the 
circumstances regulations enacted under that power would be viewed 
as “going too far” to incite a takings claim. Since the 1970s, many 
communities, states, and the Federal government had enacted 
regulations more in the name of environmental protection. There was 
a growing concern about the impact of land use activities and their 
connection to human actions and the public health. Air and water 
pollution, the disruption or destruction of wildlife habitats, and 
infringement on sensitive natural areas all received attention through 
land-use controls and regulations. Not surprisingly, real estate and 
development interests fought to change or weaken such regulations, 
with the main argument centering on economic issues and the 
violation of private property rights. 
The first significant case in the 1980s was Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.63 Here, the Court rejected a takings 
claim by a consortium of coal companies in a situation similar to the 
Pennsylvania Coal case. The State of Pennsylvania had enacted a 
mining safety act to protect the public from environmental and 
economic loss from surface uses when the mining companies 
 
60 MALONE, supra note 46. 
61 Cohen, supra note 46, at 318. Two years after Penn Central the Court rejected a 
takings claim to a local zoning ordinance that limited development but did not deny all 
viable economic use of the plaintiff’s property. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
62 Cohen, supra note 46, at 318. 
63 Keystone Bituminus Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
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removed the subsurface coal.64 The law required the coal companies 
to leave fifty percent of the coal underground to provide surface 
support.65 The coal companies claimed a taking and the Court rejected 
the argument since the regulation did not deny all economically viable 
use of the land.66 The majority dismissed the precedential value of 
Pennsylvania Coal in Keystone, and referred to it as merely 
“advisory” and not relevant to the facts at hand. 
In 1987, the Court decided two cases brought by landowners, 
which involved the takings issue. In First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, when the County of Los 
Angeles enacted a floodplain ordinance, an affected property owner 
was not allowed to rebuild in the area, which had previously been 
destroyed by a severe flood.67 The Court held that if a “taking” had 
occurred, the landowner was entitled to just compensation, even if the 
taking were temporary, but remanded the case to the state courts to 
determine whether a taking had in fact occurred.68 The state court 
later held that it had not.69 
The second decision was Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, where the Court called for an increased level of scrutiny 
of the “nexus” between land-use restrictions and the purpose of those 
restrictions.70 Again, the Court focused on the relationship between 
public needs and the condition imposed on permission for a land 
development project.71 The Coastal Commission required that the 
property owner grant a permanent public easement along the beach 
frontage of his ocean front property as a condition to receiving a 
building permit to construct a vacation home.72 Even though the Court 
upheld development restrictions or “exactions,” the specific 
 
64 Id. at 481. 
65 Id. at 476–77. 
66 Id. at 499. 
67 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
307 (1987). 
68 Id. at 321–22. 
69 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 
893, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
70 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
71 See id. 
72 Id. at 831. 
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restriction imposed on Nollan was in no way related to the purpose of 
the restrictions.73 
A highly publicized case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, involved the regulation of development in a coastal hazard 
zone in 1992.74 This matter involved the adoption of strict shoreline 
regulations before the devastating hurricane, Hugo. When Lucas 
acquired the land, residential building was allowed; yet, under the 
new regulation, he was prevented from building.75 Moreover, there 
was no allowance in the regulation that would give Lucas any relief or 
variance from the regulations.76 The decision, written by Justice 
Scalia (who also wrote the prevailing opinion in Nollan), held that 
damages are due in the “relatively rare situations” in which a 
government entity deprives a landowner of “all economically 
beneficial uses” of the land.77 In Nollan, the lower court had found 
that such a complete denial of all economically beneficial use had 
occurred.78 
As the Lucas decision established a stricter test for “total takings,” 
the Court did make two exceptions in situations where the restriction 
arises out of “background principles of the State’s law of property and 
nuisance.”79 In filing a dissenting opinion in Lucas, Justice Stevens 
provided a potentially important view when he addressed the growing 
issues and awareness of environmental matters and how this 
understanding might lead state legislatures to revise the definition of 
property and the rights of property owners, similar to what was done 
in the case of slavery.80 
In 1994, the Court was presented with the case, Stevens v. City of 
Cannon Beach.81 The City of Cannon Beach, citing zoning and beach 
access regulations, denied a permit to construct a seawall on the dry 
sand portion of the owners’ beachfront lot.82 The owners took their 
 
73 Id. at 841. 
74 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
75 Id. at 1008. 
76 Id. at 1008–09. 
77 Id. at 1026. 
78 Id. at 1009. 
79 Id. at 1029. 
80 Id. at 1068–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
81 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1207 (1994). 
82 Id. at 451. 
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appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, which upheld the City.83 The 
Oregon Court applied the “nuisance exception” from Lucas and ruled 
that the owners did not suffer a taking since—under the state’s 
common law doctrine—when they did take title, they were on notice 
that the “bundle of rights” did not include exclusive use of the dry 
sand part of the property.84 The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ 
petition for a writ of certiorari. In his dissent, Justice Scalia claimed 
that Stevens represents a “land grab,”85 which brought the critique that 
“Stevens illustrates both the flaws in the Lucas test for total takings 
and the consequent need for a new total takings test.86 
The Court revisited Nollan in 1994 in the case, Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, and emphasized that there must be a demonstration of “rough 
proportionality” between the regulatory purpose to protect the public 
interest and development conditions.87 When Dolan—whose land was 
partially within a hundred-year floodplain—wanted to expand her 
business, the City agreed as long as she dedicated the floodplain 
portion as a greenway for public use.88 The opinion was delivered by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and reaffirmed the essential “nexus” test from 
Nollan that must be found between the legitimate state interest and 
permit conditions, as well as the degree of connection between the 
exactions of the conditions and the projected impact of the proposed 
development.89 
In 2001, the Court ruled that Anthony Palazzolo had the right to 
challenge the state’s ban on development of his coastal wetlands 
property, even though he took title to the property after the state 
implemented its restrictive regulations.90 In Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, even though the trial court had determined that Palazzolo’s 
proposed development in the wetlands would have significant 
environmental impact and was in conflict with the state coastal 
resources management plan—and he still had development potential 
 
83 Id. at 460. 
84 Id. at 456. 
85 Stevens, 510 U.S at 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
86 Peter C. Meier, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach: Taking Takings Into the Post-
Lucas Era, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 413, 415 (1995). 
87 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
88 Id. at 379–80. 
89 Id. at 386–91. 
90 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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with an upland portion of the property—the Supreme Court 
determined that a taking had occurred.91 The case was sent back to the 
state courts for an analysis of compensation under the guidelines 
established in the Penn Central case.92 
I conclude this analysis (and chronological summary) by saying 
that while the Supreme Court generally will not construe government 
regulations that involve property use a taking, there are four situations 
that would be considered a taking: (1) where the property owner is 
denied all economically viable use of the land; (2) where the 
regulation forced the property owner to allow someone else to enter 
the property; (3) where the regulation imposes costs or burdens on the 
property that do not have a reasonable relationship to the impacts of 
the use on the community; (4) when government can achieve an 
equally valid public purpose through regulation or through a 
requirement of dedicating property, then the least intrusive regulation 
or requirement is preferred, and anything more is a taking. 
Where does our review of the key elements that have evolved as 
the current takings doctrine leave us today relative to the increasing 
awareness and implementation of governmental regulations to address 
environmental conditions? On this note, it has been said that “[w]hile 
the Court’s rhetoric may from time to time burnish the mantle of 
private property rights, its actual rulings give ample breathing room to 
government regulations in furtherance of land use and environmental 
goals.”93 However, a more critical view has found that “[t]he 
regulatory takings doctrine is a pernicious mess . . . . The current rules 
are a hodgepodge that the Court has been unable to explain. But 
worse, the doctrine protects economic interests in the development of 
land against otherwise valid enactments of the democratic process, 
thereby inhibiting experimentation with new environmental 
initiatives.”94 For sure, “[t]he ‘Takings Issue’ has moved to center 
stage in legislatures around the country, along with limitations on 
administrative regulations and the pruning back of some of the 
 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 632. 
93 Kayden, supra note 43, at 304 (footnote omitted). 
94 J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 
22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90 (1995). 
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nation’s basic laws that limit private activities adversely affecting the 
environment.”95 
The next challenge as we face new realities in the twenty-first 
century will be for judicial attitudes to catch up and recognize that the 
economic value to protect private property cannot be separated from 
the ecological value of that same property. The time has come for the 
Supreme Court to open up a new door and prescribe a new 
constitutional calculus in deciding cases involving the private 
property/takings issue question. It is time for the Court to 
acknowledge that the ecological values attached to private property 
cannot be held hostage to economic supremacy. 
E. Changing Judicial Attitudes and the Future 
Beginning an assessment to address twenty-first century challenges 
will be, as in the past, to ascertain if some public purposes are more 
important than others. We might ask if there are degrees of 
importance in government’s regulation of property in order to 
advance or protect the public interest; and as importantly, does the 
assessment of the public interest change over time? What might be 
considered a socially, or politically, responsible position at one point 
in history may not be considered important at a later time. Of course, 
social responsibility is one thing, judicial history may be quite 
another. There is a constitutional base and a path of case law, both 
state and federal, that will, in all likelihood, continue to juggle public 
rights and public purposes.96 
It is generally held that the judicial branch does not engage in 
policy making since this is the purview of the legislative branch. But 
the law and the judgments about the law do establish both individual 
and public guides that shape the conduct of our actions and 
relationships. In the final analysis, the Supreme Court “blends 
orthodox judicial functions with policy-making functions in a 
 
95 John C. Keene, When Does A Regulation “Go Too Far?”—The Supreme Court’s 
Analytical Framework for Drawing the Line Between an Exercise of the Police Power and 
an Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 397, 401 
(2006). 
96 Professor Sax pointed out that “Few legal problems have proved as resistant to 
analytical efforts as that posed by the Constitution’s requirement that private property not 
be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.” Sax, supra note 35, at 149. 
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complex mixture.”97 Acknowledging that the Court does indeed 
provide a leadership function, Professor Carl Brent Swisher, in 
discussing “the goal of judicial endeavor” says that the Court 
“succeeds in leading largely to the extent of its skill not merely as a 
leader but as a follower.”98 He continues, saying that 
the effectiveness of the Court’s leadership is measured by its ability 
to articulate deep convictions of need and deep patterns of desire on 
the part of the people in such a way that the people . . . will 
recognize the judicial statement as essentially their own. The Court 
must sense the synthesis of desire for both continuity and change 
and make the desired synthesis the expressed pattern of each 
decision.99 
Defining structure, precedent, and case law decisions that influence 
our actions and our lives all operate within the framework of society’s 
historical development. This is for sure a unique attribute of our 
democratic system of justice. At this juncture in our history, we need 
to probe further in a continuing quest to find a new balance for the use 
of our land relative to our protected property rights under the aegis of 
our constitutional heritage. We must ask how, in a rapidly developing 
culture, we should address very real concerns about the manner in 
which we are judicially permitted to use our private property. Is 
society best served by a judicial doctrine that relies on calculating a 
balance between private rights and public purpose coupled with an 
institutionalized supremacy of personal economic security? Or is 
society better served by a judicial doctrine that can envelop the full 
aspirations of human desires, needs, and wants—a doctrine that 
strives to change, adapt, and invent, as Professor Haar prescribed.100 
Lewis Mumford said that “[e]very culture attaches different estimates 
to man’s nature and history; and in its creative moments, it adds new 
 
97 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 20 (Daniel J. Boorstin 
ed., 1960). 
98 CARL BRENT SWISHER, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 179 (1958). 
99 Id. at 179–80. It has also been said that “[w]ithin the American tradition, the 
normative aspect of contextual legitimacy seems to depend on whether the system as a 
whole adequately contributes to a more orderly and just society in light of contemporary 
circumstances and evolving notions of justice.” STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 202 (1985). 
100 CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, 
AND REUSE OF URBAN LAND 22 (2d ed. 1971). 
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values that enlarge the human personality and give it new 
destinations.”101 This is the reality we must face in our present time. 
As we live in a period of continued change and increased 
environmental awareness—an awareness that speaks of the survival 
of the human species—we must be critically concerned about the 
inextricable relationship between the private use of land and how its 
use impacts the greater whole. The singular question that needs to be 
posed is, can the law, in all of its intellectual complexity and 
procedural rigor, transcend the decision of the moment and project 
what the moment will mean to the future? Can the law embody a soul 
that will, in the judgment of those who make judgments, allow us to 
reach the full potential of the human condition—the apotheosis of 
man on earth? 
III 
THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 
Most, if not all, questions involving property rights, as litigated 
under the takings, due process, and equal protection clauses of the 
Constitution, have involved—at their base—economic issues. If, 
through government action, a person’s property is made economically 
valueless or is so restricted that it cannot be developed for an 
economically viable use, then an individual can claim a constitutional 
infringement on property rights. But what happens when acts of 
God—nature—infringe on the use of private property? 
Each year, almost without fail, we read in the popular press about 
naturally occurring events throughout the country that cause great 
damage and loss of property. Take, for example, major floods. Many 
neighborhoods in older communities, as well as newer suburban 
developments, have been built along waterways in order to have 
access, scenic, or recreational advantages. During periods of heavy 
storms and concomitant flooding, many property owners have 
suffered severe economic loss because of their location. While it is an 
established fact that floodplains are a necessary feature in the 
hydrologic transportation system of a flood, development within their 
bounds opens up the potential of reduction or deprivation in the use of 
property. Not through the acts of others or by government activities 
 
101 LEWIS MUMFORD, 7 WORLD PERSPECTIVES: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF MAN 221 
(Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., 1956). 
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but through uncontrollable natural events. We should not forget 
Justice Holmes’ point that “[a] river is more than an amenity, it is a 
treasure. It offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those 
who have power over it.”102 
Of course, we recognize that police power holds the justification 
for government to regulate the use of land to protect the public 
interest. But this regulatory thrust is to minimize the potential 
infringement of one property use on another. The brilliance of our 
constitutional framers did not give us an institutional protection of our 
property rights against acts of nature. And, not surprisingly, our legal 
system has not had the case, John & Jane Doe v. Nature. 
Would it not follow, from our example of the flooding river, that 
nature has, notwithstanding our guarantees to private property, 
exercised a right that violates our rights? But of course, government 
has a responsibility to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its 
citizens and can exercise that responsibility to place restrictions on the 
use of property. If, in a situation such as the flood, a property loss 
ensues, cannot the owner seek compensation from government for not 
protecting his property rights? 
In the matter of our river flood, government did not cause the 
flood. Therefore, we should not be able to extract compensation from 
government. Nature, while abundant in incalculable resource wealth, 
does not have a monetary means to pay compensation claims. What is 
the property owner to do? There is only one alternative—turn back to 
government. 
Since the flood plain can be regulated, to prevent or limit 
development that would otherwise be threatened if located there, the 
limitations placed by government cannot go so far as to deny all 
economically viable use of one’s property. But, what if one said, 
“look, my property is just a little piece of this entire floodplain; surely 
what I do with it won’t have any impact on my neighbor, or for that 
matter, on the river. Why can’t I use my property the way I want?!” 
Because the delegated responsibility to regulate land use lies largely 
at the local level, and since the landowner oftentimes perceives that 
the small decisions do not really matter, there is no accountability for 
the accumulation of a myriad of small decisions, over time, that create 
problems that nobody really wants, or expected. 
 
102 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931). 
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The “tyranny of small decisions” as advanced by economist Alfred 
Kahn, is directly related to how we use our land.103 If, for example, 
one has uncontrolled or unrestricted use of a parcel of land, say on the 
river and in the floodplain and decides to fill the low area to make this 
seemingly inconsequential piece of property more usable, who could 
argue that there would be any irreversible impact on the entire river 
system? But the adjacent neighbors make the same decision, and so 
on up the river. Before long, the entire reach of the flood plain will be 
altered. When the next flood happens, everyone’s property will be 
impacted. The resultant impact, a flood that would damage all 
property owners, can have far ranging and costly results. 
A corollary to the tyranny of small decisions is the “Tragedy of the 
Commons” as purported by ecologist, Garrett Hardin.104 As 
individuals continue to exploit common resources for their own 
benefit, it may work for a while; but, since resources are limited, a 
day of reckoning will eventually come. “Ruin is the destination 
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all.”105 
The point then is that small, individual decisions on the use of land 
are important because of their inevitable relationship to aggregated, 
undesirable consequences, which in all likelihood cannot be 
anticipated. And this is precisely where the government must 
intervene, as the regulator of land use, so that in the long run both the 
individual and the general public will not lose. 
 
103 Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, 
and the Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23 (1966). Ecologist William E. Odum makes 
the transition from economics to environmental issues when he writes the following: 
No one purposely planned to destroy almost 50% of the existing marshland along 
the coasts of Connecticut and Massachusetts. In fact, if the public had been asked 
whether coastal wetlands should be preserved or converted to some other use, 
preservation would probably have been supported. However, through hundreds of 
little decisions and the conversion of hundreds of small tracts of marshland, a major 
decision in favor of extensive wetlands conversion was made without ever 
addressing the issue directly. 
William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 32 
BIOSCIENCE 728, 728 (1982). 
104 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 16 
(Garrett Hardin & John Baden eds., 1977). 
105 Id. at 20. 
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Our discussion of the river flood, as an act of nature, and its impact 
on adjoining lands which are privately owned, illustrates a not very 
complex irony: that the rights of nature (in this matter to create the 
flood) violate and overpower our individual rights to the use of 
private property. If then, this is an inescapable fact of life, how can 
we be best protected? Should we not seek a situation sanctioned by 
government intervention, through regulation, to protect our rights? 
And would this not open the door to acknowledging that man’s rights 
and nature’s rights need to reach a new understanding and level of 
computability in judicial proceedings? 
IV 
THE INCLUSION OF VALUES IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Rules of Law and Stomach Jurisprudence 
As our society has developed from the earliest days of European 
exploration, through colonial settlement and finally to expansion from 
agricultural dependence to technological achievement, how we have 
used our land has been the direct result of a dominant value system 
that has maintained the sanctity of private property rights. Our 
judicial system has institutionalized our values by legitimating our 
actions among individuals and between individuals and government. 
In a sense, we are constrained by this institutionalization of values if 
those values are strictly wedded to historical precedent. Are we to be 
guided solely by the view of Justice Holmes that “the present has a 
right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be 
remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is 
only a necessity”?106 
For the most part, our laws reflect society’s values as effectuated 
through public policy. And it would be expected that as society’s 
values change, so too would public policy. It would probably be fair 
to say that in the last twenty-five years, although the public has 
become more aware of environmental issues and the unity of nature—
that man and nature do form a bond—“legal institutions have not 
come to that realization.”107 As environmental laws have been 
 
106 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
138, 139 (1920). 
107 Kenneth A. Manaster, Law and the Dignity of Nature: Foundations of 
Environmental Law, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 746 (1977). 
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formulated, based on the advice from a wide range of 
multidisciplinary experts, interpretations of those laws fall directly to 
the legal profession. If judicial interpretations are only made by 
“analyzing separate parts of a problem, rather than the whole,”108 we 
will be confined to very narrow judgments that will not come to grips 
with future consequences. 
We might distinguish between two kinds of attitudes in thinking 
about the law, as Professor Williams has portrayed: “rules of law”—
that for every given fact situation, there is one fixed rule of law which 
will control, and which the courts can be counted on to follow; and 
“stomach jurisprudence”—that the decision in any case depends in 
large part on how the judge feels about a particular situation, in light 
of various preconceptions and social attitudes.109 It is this second 
“attitude” that falls within the purview of including social concerns 
and changing values into legal judgments. 
The juxtaposition of these two attitudes poses something of a 
dilemma when it comes to the use of private property in view of an 
increasing recognition of the importance of environmental conditions. 
This problem has been described as “doctrinal schizophrenia” which 
arises “in the courts’ willingness to permit eminent domain doctrines 
to ossify in order to protect private rights, while simultaneously 
widening the police power to effectuate the public interest in resource 
protection.”110 
B. Should Trees Have Standing? 
Perhaps the most poignant example of the “attitude” dichotomy is 
contained in the argument advanced by Professor Christopher Stone, 
Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects.111 In the early 1970s Stone, a professor of law at the 
 
108 Id. 
109 WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 46, § 4:1. 
110 John J. Costonis, “Fair” Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes 
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1047 
(1975). 
111 CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: TOWARD LEGAL 
RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (W. Kaufmann Inc. 1974). Cf. Clarence Morris, The 
Rights and Duties of Beasts and Trees: A Law Teacher’s Essay for Landscape Architects, 
17 J. LEGAL EDUCATION 185, 190 (1964) (“The presumption in favor of the natural should 
not be only a debating stance against those who propose change; it calls for legal action 
developing safeguards affirmatively creating nature’s legal rights . . . .”). 
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University of Southern California, had been “thinking about the 
interplay between law and the development of social awareness.”112 
As students were skeptical in discussing the prospect that nature 
should have legal rights, Stone needed to find a concrete example 
where such a vague notion could be tested. He found one in Sierra 
Club v. Morton, a case that had been recently decided by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.113 The U.S. Forest Service had granted a 
permit to Walt Disney Enterprises to develop Mineral King Valley, a 
huge complex of motels, restaurants, and recreation facilities in a 
wilderness area in California’s Sierra Nevada Mountains.114 
The Sierra Club brought suit for an injunction, claiming that the 
project would adversely affect the area’s aesthetic and ecological 
balance.115 The District Court had granted the preliminary injunction, 
but the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision.116 The crux of the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion was not that the Forest Service had been right in 
granting the permit but that the Sierra Club had no “standing” to bring 
the matter to the courts.117 The reasoning was that the Sierra Club 
itself “does not allege that it is ‘aggrieved’ or that it is ‘adversely 
affected’ within the meaning of the rules of standing . . . . The right to 
sue does not inure to one who does not possess it, simply because 
there is no one else willing and able to assert it.”118 
Stone’s strategy was to present a position that would “get the 
courts thinking about the park itself as a jural person—the way 
corporations are ‘persons’—the notion of nature having rights would 
here make a significant operational difference. . . .”119 
Stone’s view was succinctly presented: 
It is not inevitable, nor is it wise, that natural objects should have no 
rights to seek redress in their own behalf. It is no answer to say that 
streams and forests cannot have standing because streams and 
forests cannot speak. Corporations cannot speak either; nor can 
 
112 Garrett Hardin, Foreword to STONE, supra note 111, at xii (quoting professor 
Stone). 
113 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
114 Id. at 729. 
115 Id. at 730. 
116 Id. at 731. 
117 Id. 
118 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 32 (9th Cir. 1970), aff’d, Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
119 Hardin, supra note 112, at xiii (quoting Professor Stone). 
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states, estates, infants, incompetents, municipalities or universities. 
Lawyers speak for them. . . .120 
He called for “a new theory or myth . . . of man’s relationships to 
the rest of nature.”121 He used myth “in the sense in which, at 
different times in our history, our social ‘facts’ and relationships have 
been comprehended and integrated by reference [into] the ‘myths’ 
that we are co-signers of a social contract . . . [or that] all men are 
created equal.”122 He continued that “[w]hat is needed is a myth that 
can fit our growing body of knowledge of geophysics, biology and the 
cosmos . . . to regard the Earth . . . as one organism, of which 
Mankind is a functional part. . . .”123 
The outcome of the case was that the Supreme Court upheld the 
Ninth Circuit Court’s ruling.124 Although Stone’s thesis did not have 
validity in the majority opinion of the Court, written by Justice 
Stewart, an important judicial recognition did occur in the dissenting 
opinion written by Justice William O. Douglas. It had been part of 
Stone’s original intent to have his law journal article read by the one 
Justice “who, if anyone on the Court, might be receptive to the notion 
of legal rights for natural objects.”125 In framing his dissenting 
argument, Justice Douglas referred directly to Professor Stone’s 
position. In a direct and concise manner, Douglas was paving the way 
for a new “myth” to be developed: 
The voice of the inanimate object, therefore, should not be stilled. 
That does not mean that the judiciary takes over the managerial 
functions from the federal agency. It merely means that before these 
priceless bits of Americana (such as a valley, an alpine meadow, a 
river, or a lake) are forever lost or are so transformed as to be 
reduced to the eventual rubble of our urban environment, the voice 
of the existing beneficiaries of these environmental wonders should 
be heard.126 
Justice Douglas opened up a new level of judicial consciousness 
and somewhat unceremoniously offered a “stomach jurisprudence” 
 
120 STONE, supra note 111, at 17. 
121 Id. at 51. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 51–52. 
124 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972). 
125 Hardin, supra note 112, at xiv (quoting Professor Stone). 
126 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 749 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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that could be infused with the “rules of law.”127 Perhaps he reached 
what has been called the “inner morality of the law” that meets the 
demands of human energies that are “directed toward specific kinds 
of achievements and not merely warned away from harmful acts.”128 
He understood, in the visionary sense, both the value of the 
environment and the loss to society if advocates for protecting that 
environment do not have standing in the eyes of the law of the land. 
V 
A LAND ETHIC AND AN ECOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE 
A. Can We Survive Ourselves? 
As long as we think of ourselves as the supreme species on earth, 
endowed by our creator to conduct our present lives and actions 
without a conscious awareness of consequences for our future 
existence, we will not survive. “We see ourselves as the culmination 
and the end,” wrote Loren Eiseley, 
and if we do indeed consider our passing, we think that sunlight will 
go with us and the earth be dark. We are the end. For us continents 
rose and fell, for us the waters and the air were mastered, for us the 
great living web has pulsated and grown more intricate.129 
We have a long history of viewing the world in definable 
anthropocentric terms. Man is the ruler, all else is subservient. Nature 
is here for our benefit. We can mold and shape this benefit to fit our 
will and purpose. It has been said that 
“[t]he writers of history have seldom noted the importance of land 
use. They seem not to have recognized that the destinies of most of 
man’s empires and civilizations were determined largely by the way 
land was used. While recognizing the influence of environment on 
history, they fail to note that man usually changed or despoiled his 
environment.”130 
We can only hope that American society does not fail to understand 
this reality of history. 
 
127 See WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 46, § 4:1. 
128 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (rev. ed. 1969). 
129 LOREN EISELEY, THE IMMENSE JOURNEY 41 (Norman P. Ross ed., Time Inc. 1962) 
(1946). 
130 VERNON GILL CARTER & TOM DALE, TOPSOIL AND CIVILIZATION 7 (rev. ed.1974). 
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Failure is not agreeable to the American psyche that promotes 
growth, development, and progress. In large measure, we continue 
through cycles of growth and decline only to reach a new synthesis of 
more growth. We suppose that we have gained new knowledge that 
will increase the potential for new opportunities. But we need to be 
mindful of what Rene Dubos said: “Knowledge is more effective as a 
generator of possibilities than as a guide to choice and as a source of 
ethics . . . . [T]he management of the Earth must be value conscious 
and value oriented.”131 
Contemporary American society seems to have become entangled 
in an upward, never-ending cycle of growth and development. We are 
striving for new heights in community-living patterns as we spread 
into new places. Our population keeps expanding while our natural 
resources do not. We have not come to a universal acknowledgment 
that there are limits to nature because these would place limitations on 
man. Finally, we have allowed our institutionalized system of private 
property rights to have supremacy over the rights of nature. We need, 
at this juncture in our history, to infuse a new property theory into our 
thinking that can be judicially tested and ultimately sustained. To do 
this, we need to consciously meld our desire for a livable environment 
with action to make it happen. We must begin by embracing a new 
land ethic. 
B. Starting with a Land Ethic 
When A Sand County Almanac was first published in 1949, Aldo 
Leopold gave us a clear direction that a land ethic changes the role of 
man “from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and 
citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also 
respect for the community . . . .”132 For Leopold, the community is 
everything that we know as the environment—water, earth, and sky—
and all of the creatures that abound, with man simply being one 
member of the community. He was not the first to excoriate us for not 
abiding by an ethic that achieves a balance with nature, but he was the 
first to posit an obligation to develop an ecological conscience as “an 
 
131 RENÉ DUBOS, THE WOOING OF EARTH 153 (1980). 
132 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 204 (2d prtg. 1950). 
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internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and 
convictions.”133 
Can the leap be made from the concept of a land ethic, in the way 
Leopold thought of it, to a legal construction that could be embodied 
in Supreme Court decisions about private property? It can be done, as 
Christopher Stone has shown; but we are still bound to the 
institutionalized and judicially reinforced behavior pattern of being 
separate from and above nature vis-à-vis our attitudes about property 
rights. Professor Freyfogle spoke about the status of legal scholarship 
being “particularly prone to undervalue ethical impulses and 
intuition” and that “legal scholars as much as others need to speak 
from the heart.”134 What we need in the end is to have “a vocabulary 
that gives to right and wrong as much room as it gives to efficiency 
and entitlements.”135 
The stark reality is that a land ethic does not just reflect some 
utopian ideal or romanticized conceptualization of nature. Rather, it is 
the necessary value base that will allow us to come to grips with 
rights, responsibilities, and survival. A land ethic is as necessary as an 
ecological imperative. 
C. The Ecological Principle in Using Land 
When Ian McHarg published Design with Nature in 1969 both the 
nation and the world were given a bold new direction to undertake 
land-use development within a sensitive and responsive balance with 
nature.136 What emerged from this milestone work was that the notion 
of ecological planning was crucial if we wished to continue to 
develop and not to destroy our environmental resources and 
amenities. The notion, simply put, is that “natural phenomena are 
dynamic interacting processes, responsive to laws, and that these 
proffer opportunities and limitations to human use.”137 The McHarg 
method, as it has been called, was a complete categorization and 
assessment of all elements of the environment—from bedrock 
geological forms to surface hydrology to soils and vegetation to 
 
133 Id. at 210. 
134 Eric T. Freyfogle, The Land Ethic and Pilgrim Leopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217, 
254 (1990). 
135 Id. at 255. 
136 IAN L. MCHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969). 
137 Id. at 79. 
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climatic activity—in order to find the most suitable locations for land-
use development. By determining the most “propitious” locations, 
based on natural features evaluations, man could adapt the 
environment to his needs and use with the least negative impact on his 
total habitat. 
The importance of the ecological planning approach is that it 
identifies those lands that are most suitable for development. It is 
therefore the “right” of the land to determine its suitability based upon 
its resource value as a given creation of nature. Of course, the 
question concerning private ownership is not part of the equation in 
making the determination of land use suitability. Professor McHarg 
was mindful of the issue of ownership and the economic variables 
involving costs and consequences in land development using 
ecological planning principles. He said, “[i]t seems clear that laws 
pertaining to land use and development need to be elaborated to 
reflect the public costs and consequences of private action.”138 An 
extension of this concern is that through resource destruction, costs 
will be incurred by the public, which should ultimately be allocated to 
the landowner. 
D. Building a New “Myth” 
If we utilize the land ethic and ecological planning principles as a 
means to recognize and advance the inextricable relationship between 
man and the land, we will open up an enlightened prospect to 
enunciate a new “myth” or theory about private property rights as 
they interface with property use. 
Theory building is, to a great extent, based on criticism of both the 
existing and the expected. Endemic to the intellectual process of new 
theory building is the realization of potential. The questions, ‘can we 
do it better’ or ‘can we find a more meaningful way,’ have as their 
underpinning a search for improvement. Even though social and 
political views will be the essential shapers and promoters of any new 
theory or “myth,” the ultimate test for institutional legitimately will 
rest with the courts. 
 
138 Id. at 65. 
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VI 
TOWARD FASHIONING A NEW TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
A. An Ecological Critique of the Current Takings Doctrine 
The laws that govern us and their judicial interpretations, 
particularly those that have shaped our coveted right to private 
property, have evolved as a set of acceptable and unwavering social 
and economic priorities. Generally, our attitudes toward land, 
including its ownership and use, have not shaken loose from the early 
views of our constitutional founders. 
While it is true that the protection of natural resources through 
federal and state statutes has been accomplished over the years, there 
has been no major paradigm shift to address the function of private 
property as an ecological component of the total environment. The 
first major environmental law became effective in 1970 and ushered 
in a new era of environmental and resource protection. The National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) stressed that it was national policy 
to encourage harmony between man and the environment.139 The most 
notable feature of NEPA and its regulations is the requirement of an 
environmental assessment to be conducted for all major, federally-
sponsored development projects significantly affecting the 
environment.140 NEPA was followed by the Clean Air Act,141 the 
Clean Water Act,142 and the Endangered Species Act,143 each focusing 
on specific environmental and resource concerns under their 
respective titles.144 Even though from a public policy point of view, 
there has been an increasing awareness of the environmental impact 
from man’s activities, a missing link still exists between 
environmental protection, as a declared goal in the public interest, and 
the potential of private property violations that would invoke a 
takings claim. 
All of our environmental laws have imposed restrictions on our 
freedom of choice and conduct, and they have mirrored a social 
 
139 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
140 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502 (2013). 
141 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012). 
142 See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
143 See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
144 See W. JACK GROSSE, THE PROTECTION & MANAGEMENT OF OUR NATURAL 
RESOURCES, WILDLIFE, & HABITAT (2d ed. 1997) (documenting a comprehensive account 
of the history and function of national regulations to protect environmental resources). 
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concern for maintaining environmental integrity. But the laws of 
nature, not enacted by any legislative body, are fixed—they are 
imposed on us by the natural world. This forms the basis of an 
ecological imperative as it reflects our use of private property. 
Scientific study of the natural processes and the relationship of living 
organisms within a natural system has time and time again warned us 
of how human activity has been directly responsible for 
environmental degradation. Simply put, natural laws will continue to 
function and our well-being is in direct proportion to the manner in 
which society utilizes its natural resources. 
There are three points that encompass an ecological critique of the 
takings doctrine: First, that each parcel of private property is a piece 
of the ecosystem; second, the relationship between ownership and 
economic supremacy; third, that land left in its natural state does have 
economic value. 
The first point of the ecological critique emphasizes the fact that 
everything is connected and that all individual parcels of land are 
related—related to their geographical location as well as to their 
surrounding resources, the water, and the air. This is consistent with 
and follows from the above discussion of the concept of a land ethic 
and the ecological principle in using land. The Court needs to face the 
interconnectedness factor, which the decisions involving takings have 
not done. 
While it is true that environmental legislation does place 
restrictions on land use, the insistence on making sure that regulations 
do not go too far to inhibit economic benefit, overrides any projected 
aggregated public environmental consequences of an individual’s 
protected land use prerogatives. This attitude alone militates any 
reconciliation of judicial decisions with reality.145 
The second point in the ecological critique of the takings doctrine 
revolves around the function of land as a commodity within a free 
market system. According to Leopold, “[o]ne basic weakness in a 
 
145 We could think that it is axiomatic that 
[o]ur knowledge of the social, economic and environmental relationships of various 
uses of land has become increasingly sophisticated and complex, but unless this 
knowledge is brought to the attention of the courts and legislatures they will make 
decisions on the basis of outmoded concepts dating from a simpler age. 
FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 287 (1973) (commissioned by the Council 
on Environmental Quality). 
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conservation system based wholly on economic motives is that most 
members of the land community have no economic value.”146 Only 
when one of these “non-economic categories” is threatened do we 
give it economic value. The key point that Leopold makes is that we 
falsely assume that “the economic parts of the biotic clock will 
function without the uneconomic parts.”147 
David Hunter, in a stimulating essay, proposed that one of the 
shortcomings of judicial decisions in takings cases, in the context of 
the current economic view of property is that 
even if the courts incorporated the social costs of development into 
their decisionmaking, much of the land’s value to the ecological 
community is not cognizable in the language of economics. Most 
environmental amenities cannot adequately be monetized, not 
because they are not valuable, but because they are not supplied 
through a market.148 
A corroborating view that pushes the argument even further is that 
“[a]fter examining how natural systems function and considering their 
vulnerability in the context of incomplete property rights and market 
failure, we can identify several justifications for a public ownership 
interest in the ecological integrity of a natural resource.”149 This 
position relies on many of the factors discussed earlier that focus on 
the vulnerability of natural systems and how a degradation of 
ecological integrity affects each and all.150 
Finally, can a landowner accrue an economic benefit by leaving 
land in its natural state? And can the importance of ecology be 
recognized in a takings claim? In 1972, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
did exactly that in Just v. Marinette County.151 Beginning in 1961, the 
landowners bought thirty-six acres of land along a lakefront in 
Marinette County, which they added to over the years.152 In 1967, the 
County adopted a shoreline-zoning ordinance to protect navigable 
 
146 LEOPOLD, supra note 132, at 210. 
147 Id. at 214. 
148 David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial 
Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 335 (1988). 
149 Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging 
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 418 (1991). 
150 Id. at 418-21. 
151 Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
152 Id. at 766. 
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waters that prohibited the filling of wetlands without a conditional use 
permit.153 The landowners proceeded to fill a portion of the wetlands 
on their property without applying for the permit.154 They were 
charged with violating the ordinance, and they subsequently filed a 
claim of taking without compensation.155 
What makes this case unique was not so much that the court 
recognized the ecological role of wetlands but that a theory of 
property based on the natural character of land was put forward. In 
part, the court stated, “[a]n owner of land has no absolute and 
unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so 
as [to] use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state 
and which injures the rights of others.”156 The court, in reconciling its 
position with general takings law, concluded that there would be no 
loss of economic value to the owner by leaving land in its natural 
condition: 
The Just’s argue their property has been severely depreciated in 
value. But this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the 
land in its natural state but on what the land would be worth if it 
could be filled and used for the location of a dwelling. While loss of 
value is to be considered in determining whether a restriction is a 
constructive taking, value based upon changing the character of the 
land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an essential factor 
or controlling.157 
After Just we could say that the door has been opened, only by a 
small, but potentially monumental crack, to pierce the economic 
supremacy veil that surrounds our conventional acceptance of the 
economic perspective of loss and gain in a free market to one that 
prescribes ecological considerations. The challenge is to make such a 
modification compatible with our private property rights insofar as 
the takings doctrine is involved and to emphasize the individual’s 
welfare (in this case economic). But where does this leave the issue of 
protecting the public’s resource base? 
 
153 Id. at 764–65. 
154 Id. at 766. 
155 Id. at 766–67. 
156 Id. at 768. 
157 Id. at 771; Hunter, supra note 148, at 353–57 (discussing “post-Just cases” in the 
states of Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, and especially New Hampshire that have 
relied on the Wisconsin experience to advance a “natural use theory”). 
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B. Protecting Ecological Values: The Public Trust Doctrine 
For a number of years, legal scholars have been examining the 
public trust doctrine as an example of protecting public resources in 
light of their ecological value.158 Briefly put, the public trust doctrine 
“is that the state holds the public lands of the state in trust for the 
public and that any attempt to sell these lands to private interests, or 
to otherwise divert them to private use, will be viewed with 
skepticism.”159 The interest in the doctrine is that it “permits the states 
to avoid traditional takings inquiries when they are merely fulfilling 
their obligations as trustees of the public’s interest in private 
lands.”160 This is seen as having great potential for incorporating a 
land ethic into property law. In advancing this argument, three cases 
are cited which suggest that there is a judicial inclination to at least 
recognize the importance of ecology as a public benefit. 
The California Supreme Court in Marks v. Whitney proclaimed that 
[t]here is a growing public recognition that one of the most 
important public uses of the tidelands . . . is the preservation of 
those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as 
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine 
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the 
area.161 
A second California case, National Audubon Society v. Superior 
Court (known as the “Mono Lake” case) reiterated the ecological 
protection language of Marks.162 It continued that protecting the 
ecological integrity of the land was one of the purposes of the public 
 
158 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also Hunter, supra note 148; 
Rieser, supra note 149, at 393;  
159 Donald W. Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land As 
Property, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 1039, 1067 (1973). A refinement of the definition is that 
the Public Trust Doctrine provides that title to tidal and navigable freshwaters, the 
lands beneath, as well as the living resources inhabiting these waters within a State 
is a special title. It is a title held by the State in trust for the benefit of the public, 
and establishes the right of the public to use and enjoy these trust waters, lands and 
resources for a wide variety of recognized public uses. 
DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., Executive Summary to PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
TO WORK, at xvi (David C. Slade ed., 1990) (prepared under contract with the Connecticut 
Department of Environmental Protection, Coastal Resources Management division). 
160 Hunter, supra note 147, at 367. 
161 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
162 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
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trust.163 The Supreme Court at least recognized one kind of ecosystem 
in a 1988 ruling in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi & Saga 
Petroleum U.S., Inc when it found that non-navigable and tidal waters 
“are connected to the sea.”164 The Court continued, “[p]erhaps the 
lands at issue here differ in some ways from tidelands directly 
adjacent to the sea; nonetheless, they still share those ‘geographical, 
chemical and environmental’ qualities that make lands beneath the 
tidal waters unique.”165 
The relationship between the public trust doctrine and the takings 
issue is that no interests are affected through the state’s exercise of its 
public responsibilities. No takings occur since no private rights were 
ever conveyed. But the doctrine has established an important 
legitimacy of the concept of ecology as a valuable protection of the 
public interest.166 
C. Fashioning a New Doctrine: An Ecological Use Theory of 
Property 
The achievements of our society have been unparalleled in the 
history of the world. The arts and humanities have allowed us to reach 
new levels of awareness and creativity. The sciences have opened up 
new avenues of exploration and understanding. Through our system 
of government, we strive to discover more responsible institutions for 
our social arrangements. There seems to be in practically everything 
we do the quest to continually make progress. Julian Huxley noted 
that “[t]he idea of progress is a mere anthropomorphism. Man 
happens to be the dominant type at the moment, but he might be 
replaced by the ant or the rat.”167 
One of man’s greatest capacities is the ability to engage in 
conceptual thought. With this ability, we are fully endowed to 
contemplate a condition of our own existence in view of our feelings, 
 
163 Id. at 719. 
164 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 470 (1988). 
165 Id. at 481 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 44 U.S. 164, 183 (1979) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
166 In addition to the public trust doctrine, courts are also interpreting other common 
law doctrines that recognize public property rights in natural resources. See Lynda L. 
Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 323 (1990). 
167 Julian S. Huxley, The Uniqueness of Man, in THE BOOK OF NATURALISTS 395, 396 
(William Beebe ed., 1944). 
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goals, and aspirations. We operationalize these contemplations by our 
living arrangements and through the creation of relationships, 
between ourselves and others, and between ourselves and our 
community. If we accept the premise that we exist as part of an 
interactive community, then man is simply one element of his 
surroundings. There can be no rational denial that nature exists and 
that man is within, not apart from nature. 
In order to effectuate an existence of harmony and growth, we have 
invented social systems that, in their truest ideal, attempt to bring 
each and all of us to a realization of our full potential. Our American 
social system, in the broadest sense, allows us to engage in individual 
growth while also imposing constraints in order to avoid conditions 
that would be deleterious to both our individual welfare and to the 
society as a whole. 
At the base of American liberty is the right to own private property. 
That right will, in all likelihood, never be changed. The right to use 
private property and the extent of that use has been determined by 
government regulation and either upheld or denied by court decisions. 
However, the judicial history, as written by the Supreme Court, has 
not made a decisive linkage between the value of private property and 
how it functions as part of a larger natural system. This failing, as 
ecological analysis has confirmed, will do ultimate damage to both 
the environment and man himself. It appears that what is needed is a 
new recognition of property rights, as these rights are embodied in 
both a conceptual and practical utilization of the traditional takings 
doctrine. We need to enunciate what I shall call an ecological use 
theory of property. 
The precepts of this theory are based on four components: (1) The 
acceptance of the undisputed value of a land ethic as an acceptable 
social and political norm, (2) a recognition of an ecological 
imperative in the way we plan for the future use of our land, (3) an 
expansion of the noxious use principle that establishes legal 
parameters for private use that will create public harm, and (4) finally, 
the takings doctrine would be modified so that a property owner 
would be denied a right to destroy property of ecological integrity. 
I have established a basis for the first two precepts through the 
previous discussion in Part VI, sections B and C, which will now 
allow us to turn to a discussion of operationalizing an ecological use 
theory of property as proposed by precepts 3 and 4 above. 
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The common law nuisance concept was promoted at a time when 
the idea of environmental impact was not a consideration. However, 
the purpose upon which it is based, “that no one should have a right to 
use his property to the injury of his fellows, could furnish the basis for 
a more ecologically sensitive takings theory.”168 An explanation of the 
expansion of the nuisance concept was provided by Professor Sax 
when he originated the “spillover” theory of taking.169 The key 
element of this proposal in determining if a particular governmental 
regulation is a legitimate exercise of the police power or a 
compensable taking is the extent to which the use (existing or 
proposed) has a “spillover or inextricable effect on other property.”170 
He describes three categories of spillover effects: First, the manner in 
which one uses land may result in a physical restriction of the uses 
that may be made of other lands—for example, coal mining, which 
could result in drainage on lower-lying land.171 Second, a spillover 
effect can occur in the use of common resources to which many 
landowners have an equal right—for example, the dumping of 
industrial effluent into a stream, which a downstream landowner 
depends on for water supply.172 Finally, the use of property that 
impacts the health or well-being of others—for example, the 
depositing of toxic materials that results in the death of wildlife or the 
use of property that imposes an obligation on the community, such as 
residential development in a remote area that would require the 
provision of police protection.173 
What Sax hopes for is that the courts would adapt “the nuisance 
concept to public rights in environmental quality.”174 After all, he 
insists, “[t]here is no good reason why we should hesitate to adopt a 
theory of public rights to environmental quality, enforceable at law, 
nor is there any reason to think we cannot adjudicate the reasonable 
 
168 Michael B. Metzger, Private Property and Environmental Sanity, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
793, 813 (1976). 
169 Sax, supra note 35, at 161–62. 
170 Id. at 161. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 161–62. 
173 Id. at 162. 
174 JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN 
ACTION 160 (1971). 
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accommodations needed to protect against unnecessary threats to the 
environment.”175 
This brings us to the fourth precept: modifying the current takings 
doctrine to include an ecological use theory of property. To begin, 
Sax’s spillover theory is a consistent extension of the ecological 
principle of classifying land according to its capability to sustain 
certain uses based upon natural resources constrains. Thus, levels of 
impact on the natural resource base could be assigned to categories of 
land use. This could be done similar to how performance standards 
are applied to measuring land use impact. 
Regarding the takings doctrine, the Court would need to recognize 
the value of such a procedure, much as the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
did in Just. This would necessitate that the Court would “refuse to 
recognize a property right on the part of any landowner to use his 
property in a manner for which it is inherently unsuited due to its 
physiographic nature.”176 Moreover, by incorporating ecological 
considerations into the takings doctrine, a redefinition of both private 
and public rights relative to use would be based on the objective 
findings of the environmental sciences. 
D. The Court’s Constitutional Calculus: A Hypothetical Preview 
How would the Court determine if a taking had occurred under the 
ecological use theory as proposed? The Court, in reviewing the extent 
of a government regulation, would uphold the regulation “if it finds 
that the regulation merely prevented the land owner from destroying 
the existing environmental character of the land.”177 Similarly, the 
Court would uphold the regulation if it finds “that the public was 
merely asserting its right to the ecological integrity of the land 
pursuant to expanded versions of the navigation servitude or public 
trust doctrine.”178 
The outcome is the same, whether the Court is concerned with 
limiting private rights or protecting the public interest. A two-part 
inquiry would be undertaken: first, is the regulation “reasonably 
related to the protection of ecologically important land?”; and second, 
“does the land in question have the environmental qualities protected 
 
175 Id. at 161. 
176 Metzger, supra note 168, at 817. 
177 Hunter, supra note 148, at 380. 
178 Id. 
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by the legislation?”179 If both inquiries are answered by the Court 
affirmatively, then the regulation would be upheld.180 
A modification of the current takings doctrine, as proposed by an 
ecological use theory of property, would not promote collective 
ownership; rather, it would be construed as an extension of rights in 
the “bundle of rights” of private ownership. In this sense, it would be 
a higher right of private responsibility that will avoid the tyranny of 
the small decisions, which ultimately leads to the tragedy of the 
commons—in both cases negatively affecting us all. 
CONCLUSION 
From the early days of our nation’s beginnings and the 
establishment of a unique form of democratic government, natural 
law and natural rights became the undisputed guides to insure liberty 
and to direct the aspirations of a new American society. Our 
constitutional heritage has served us well. It has preserved our 
liberties and it has been responsive to social changes in many ways. 
Yet, how far government can regulate the use of private property in 
protecting the public interest possesses inherent trouble for the 
sustenance of our society if the Supreme Court’s current takings 
doctrine is not changed. 
We live in a different age than our founders. And we must face the 
knowledge that the rights of man must be more profoundly integrated 
with the rights of nature. If man is truly a part of nature, we must fully 
recognize that when we infringe on nature’s balance we also infringe 
on ourselves and our individual property rights. That is the inevitable 
reality. 
  
 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
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